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ABSTRACT 
How should a historian or a judicial scholar try to determine the intent of defendants in 
a racial or sex discrimination lawsuit, or the framers of a law or constitutional provision? 
What can we learn by examining paradigm cases from the employment and voting rights 
areas, and the classic case of the intentions of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
Making use of models drawn from statistics and from rational choice theory, I examine 
the general contours of the Sears sex discrimination case, a voting rights suit from Selma, 
Alabama, and Raoul Berger's attempt to nullify Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in his 
Government by Judiciary. Sears' and Berger's methods and evidentiary conventions are shown 
to lead to biased results. 
EXPERT WITNESSES AND INTENT 
J. Morgan Kousser 
Although students of individual personality have been serving as expert witnesses since at 
least the 1 7th century, when Sir Thomas Browne assured an English jury that witches existed 
and that, in his opinion, the defendants in the instant case were, indeed, witches, historians, 
psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists only began like duty with any regularity in the 
preparation of the school segregation cases in the 1 940s and 1 950s. 1 In Brown v. School
Board of Topeka, the Supreme Court and the litigants were concerned with the question of 
intent in two very different ways: they asked historians whether the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had meant to ban racial segregation in schools or not; and they asked 
other social scientists, in effect, whether the impact of segregation was so deleterious to black 
people that it could be assumed that segregation ordinances were adopted with a racially 
discriminatory motive.2
In the 1 960s and 70s, the discussion of what became known as de facto and de jure 
school segregation turned on the question of motivation, as did those of the legality of 
various housing laws and employment practices. 3 This stream of decisions perhaps reached
its high water mark in the 1 980 voting rights case of Mobile v. Bolden, which brought 
historical expert witness testimony to the fore again.4 In his plurality opinion in Bolden,
Justice Potter Stewart ruled that it was not enough to show that the at-large election feature 
of the Mobile City Commission had the ef feet of discriminating against blacks, but that it 
was necessary to demonstrate that the framers of the arrangement had adopted it with an 
intent to discriminate. For the next two years, the major point of discussion in debates over 
the renewal of the Voting Rights Act concerned whether an effect standard should be 
unmistakably written into the law to replace what Stewart believed was the existing intent 
standard.5
Likewise, the great brouhaha in the historical profession in 1 986 over the testimony of 
Professors Rosalind Rosenberg and Alice Kessler-Harris in the Sears sex discrimination case 
centrally involved intent.6 Rosenberg was brought into the litigation to testify on the
question of whether the apparent pattern of sex discrimination shown by employment 
statistics proved that Sears intended to discriminate against women in commission sales hires 
or whether women's allegedly different motives in seeking employment could explain the 
statistical results away. The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission employed Kessler­
Harris to criticize Rosenberg's account of women's purposes, and in the ensuing extra­
judicial controversy, each of the combatants attacked the other's motives in testifying as she 
did. Moreover, the emerging strategy of the defendants in both voting rights and affirmative 
action litigation has concentrated on the use of statistics to prove or disprove intent. 
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In the world of non-policy-oriented scholarship as well, some of the most important 
controversies of the last hundred years have been concerned with intent. Wilhelm Dilthey's 
concept of versthehen involved a projection of the historian into the thoughts and feelings of 
historical actors in order to understand what moved them.7 Seeking to circumvent the
problem of verifying whether economic actors engaged in maximizing �heir utility and were 
completely aware of their alternatives, Milton Friedman suggested that we examine only 
whether they behaved as if they were fully informed profit maximizers.8 More informally,
many if not most of the large questions that lie behind the workaday concerns of historians 
and other social scientists involve the assessment of intention: Can inanimate "fundamental 
forces," such as industrialization, immigration, or urbanization be said to "cause" certain 
events? To what degree are certain consequences of actions intended or unintended? Do 
voters generally act "rationally" or for "symbolic," non-instrumental reasons? How can we 
determine why groups of people behaved the way they did? Is it even possible to say that 
one interpretation of causation is better than another? 
On all these questions and more, it seems to me, the experiences and reflections of expert 
witnesses, legal scholars, and other social scientists have a good deal to say to historians, and 
vice versa. In both the professional and legal arenas, scholars have shown too little self­
awareness in their attributions of motives, and in their attempts to discern the meanings of 
human actions. Although I cannot claim to have solved any large problems, reflections on 
my experiences both in and out of the courtroom may at least bring some issues to 
consciousness and help to clarify their nature. To initiate the debate, I will examine three 
paradigmatic instances of the determination of intent in what seems to me increasing order of 
complexity: statistical cases about differential treatment, laws, and general constitutional 
provisions. 
Even when white male Americans have openly admitted their desires to treat reds, 
browns, blacks, or females differently, they have usually disavowed any hostile purposes. 
When they excluded blacks from common or "white" schools in the 1 840s, for instance, the 
Boston School Committee claimed that they were acting "in the best interests" of blacks, just 
as southern whites and men all over purported to be protecting Afro-Americans and women 
by denying them the vote. It has never been easy to find sworn, public expressions of ethnic 
or gender discrimination that would satisfy an antipathetic judge.9 As a consequence, both
legalists and historians have generally turned to circumstantial evidence of intent, which has 
always included evidence drawn from effects. Thus, even where 1 9th century judges ruled 
school segregation constitutional, they still gauged the motives of school boards by requiring 
that the education offered blacks had to be "substantially equal" to that given whites. 1 0
Those effects were often judged by evidence which was at least i n  principle quantifiable, 
such as per capita appropriations, teachers' credentials, the quality of school buildings, the 
distance children had to walk to school, and so on. There is nothing new about using 
statistics about effects to judge whether discrimination has taken place. 
No reasonable person would expect Sears executives or southern legislators or city fathers 
to admit on the record that they structured employment or election procedures to promote sex 
or race discrimination. Not even the disf ranchisers of the late 1 9th century wrote race 
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explicitly into their qualifications. Instead, they skillfully found correlates of race- -literacy, 
property, conviction for such crimes as petty theft or miscegenation- -and debarred people 
with those traits, adducing as reasons that they wanted educated, honest electors who had a 
"stake in society." They then let minor administrators carry out their actual and obvious 
purposes. 1 1  Similarly, present-day employers claim that they want only an aggressive, 
experienced, unreservedly dedicated work force, and framers of at-large election schemes 
desire cosmopolitan, rather than localistically-oriented commissioners, councilmen, or school 
board members. 
The correlation gambit is also used when their practices are challenged in court. The 
strategy is to find correlates of race or gender and then to use them as explanatory variables, 
or, if they cannot be measured, as explanations in principle. Past discrimination thus 
becomes an excuse for present and future discrimination. If Sears and other employers rarely 
hired women to sell consumer durables before 1 973, it is not difficult to see why they had 
such trouble finding experienced women for such lines after that date. Throw in 
"experience" on the right-hand side of a regression equation of hires on gender, and it is no 
surprise that the effect of gender is reduced. Likewise, individual Latinos and southern 
blacks have only recently attained much political visibility, they usually have difficulty 
raising as much money as white candidates do, and nearly all are Democrats, whereas most 
southern whites are now at least occasional presidential Republicans. Add such independent 
variables, and the effect of race on electoral success or polarization tends to wash out. 1 2  But
what do such equations really tell us about causation? What picture of the world do they 
represent? 
The portrait is an unreal, idealized one, in which men and women have exactly the same 
employment histories, express a determination to sell in precisely the same fashion, have 
equal knowledge of what has heretofore been considered by employers a separate male 
sphere. It's a universe where blacks are just as educated and wealthy as whites, in which 
partisanship and race are unrelated, and in which the effects of past discrimination all 
disappeared at the stroke of Lyndon Johnson's pens on the Voting Rights Act. It's a dream 
world concocted in a computer or a witness's head for the transparent purpose of preventing 
those egalitarian fables from becoming realities, a set of tautological creations in which 
discrimination-free utopias are assumed in order to prove that no discrimination took place. 
The determination of the intent of the proponents of a law is always uncertain because 
of the paucity of data, imperfections in the correlations between attitudes and behavior, and 
multiple purposes of the actors. Indeed, if it were easy to weigh the desires of large groups 
of people with certainty, most historiographical controversy would be eliminated, the need 
for review articles and books taking "fresh approaches" would be diminished, and the 
unemployment and underemployment rates for historians would rise even higher than they 
are today. It is therefore not entirely unfortunate that I have no general solution to the 
difficulties of unentangling motives. Nonetheless, I do have a few suggestions on how to go 
about the task more systematically. 
Let us start, commonsensically, with a text. It may be that a law is so specific as to 
make at least some of the legislators' goals unmistakable, and this is particularly true in the 
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U.S., where laws are generally framed to allow less administrative discretion than in many 
European countries. As Supreme Court Justice John H. Clarke once noted about the language 
of a particular statute, "It is so plain that to argue it would obscure it.11 1 3  Yet even here, the
difficulty of answering a question about motivation depends crucially on how broadly the 
question is phrased. If the law says that the speed limit shall not exceed 55 miles per hour, 
or that persons who use a gun during the commission of a felony must serve at least some 
time in prison, or that the performing or conspiring to arrange an abortion is illegal, it is 
easy to identify criminal acts, but not so simple to discover why the legislators voted for the 
laws. Some may have desired to conserve energy, others, to prevent auto accidents; some, to 
inhibit violent crimes, others, to punish those who committed them; some, to protect the lives 
of fetuses, others, merely to avoid electoral challenges from the anti-abortionists or to honor 
a logrolling agreement involving a measure that they cared more about. Even an 
unambiguous statute may not provide unambiguous testimony on motives. And when a judge 
is trying to mete out punishment in cases brought under such laws, those deeper motives of 
the legislators may be important. 
A law may provide clues to its purpose and genesis on its face, and a knowledge of other 
related events and of the legislature's standard operating procedures may yield interpretive 
hints. In 1 90 1 ,  for instance, the Alabama legislature passed a law changing the Dallas County 
commission from an appointive to an elective body. 14  Each commissioner had to reside in
one of four electoral districts, but all the voters in the county could cast ballots for every 
commissioner. As of 1 98 1, when I testified in the Justice Department's challenge to this law 
in Selma--I was 1 6  years late for the march, but things hadn't changed much, anyway--no 
black person had served on that black belt county's commission for over a century. 
I began my testimony there by noting that the at-large feature of that local law seemed 
patently to have been affixed to the end of the statute in a fashion that was barely 
grammatical and wholly illogical. In the penultimate clause of section 6 of the law, the 
winner was required to receive a plurality in the district, but the last clause provided that 
every voter in the county could vote for each commissioner, and it was silent on whether a 
plurality or a majority of the whole electorate was necessary for election and what would 
result if a commissioner carried the county, but lost his district. When I read this to Judge W. 
Brevard Hand, who has recently become nationally notorious for banning school textbooks 
that contain what he has termed "the religion of secular humanism," and who had in 1 98 1  
been considering the Dallas County voting case for five years, the judge remarked that the 
law was so unclear that someone ought to bring a legal challenge to it. The lawyer for 
Justice deadpanned that he thought that's what we were there for. Why would someone stick 
on an at-large voting scheme? 
The historical context helped. Dallas county had been over 80% black since the early 
antebellum period, and its elected officials during Reconstruction had been either black or 
white radical Republicans. In the late 1 870s, after Alabama had been "redeemed," therefore, 
the state legislature simply abolished local elections in this and several other similar counties, 
obviating the need for violence or ballot-box stuffing to maintain white Democratic 
supremacy locally. By 1 90 1 ,  the Populists having been at least temporarily defeated and a 
constitutional convention to disfranchise blacks and poor whites having been authorized, but 
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not yet convened, Selma Democrats felt confident enough of their ability to control elections 
to draft a bill and have the county's representatives introduce it. Since Alabama legislators 
customarily def erred to their colleagues on local legislation (unless, of course, those colleagues 
happened to be Republicans or Populists), the bill sailed through without reported discussion, 
amendment, or any adverse votes. Whatever it was these locals wanted, they got, though 
there was no direct evidence in legislative journals or even hometown newspapers as to the 
reasons for the suspicious at-large section.15
Could the local notables in Selma have had anything to fear from blacks at the time? I 
concluded that they could have. Suppose that the constitutional convention were to adopt a 
literacy test as the sole disfranchising device. Then, despite egregious educational 
discrimination, the black density in the county was so overwhelming that a small majority of 
the literate voters, as measured by the 1900 census, would still be nonwhite. By mapping the 
electoral districts into census districts and sampling from the manuscript census returns, I was 
able to show that two of the four county commission districts would have had substantial 
black majorities in 1900, and a third would have had a bare black majority, if the electorate 
were confined to literate voters. In a district system, then, with anything like a fairly 
administered literacy qualification, blacks would control half the seats, while in an at-large 
setting, it would take but a minor amount of skullduggery, compared to what Dallas County 
voting officials had perpetrated for the last generation in state elections, to segregate the 
courthouse completely. 
It therefore seemed to me that the most plausible reason for the adoption of the 1901 at­
large system was a racist one. In case the convention only disfranchised illiterates or a 
widely-expected law suit forced equitable enforcement of voting laws, the at-large system 
provided insurance.16 Judge Hand disagreed, suggesting during the trial that white Selmans
couldn't have had a racist motive in passing the law, because they could always have stuffed 
the ballot box or killed their opponents. What motivated them, this Nixon Republican 
announced, was what he considered the fundamental human drive--greed. It was not so 
much that they opposed blacks, as that they wanted all the offices for themselves. The Court 
of Appeals somehow managed to produce a printable response to this masterful reasoning, 
curtly overturning Judge Hand.17
Because few state legislatures have kept formal records of debates, newspaper coverage 
of legislative proceedings is sketchy (although it was generally less so in the nineteenth than 
in the twentieth century) and committee hearings and reports have rarely been extensive until 
rather recently, the amount of data available for uncovering the motives of state legislators is 
usually less than for an Act of Congress. As in other instances, having less information 
makes it easier to come to a conclusion, but harder to be sure of it. On major controversial 
bills, if the historian is lucky, there will be a few partially reported speeches, some 
frustratingly vague newspaper stories and editorials, a roll call vote or two on amendments, 
and perhaps the text of the bill reported out by the relevant committee. If the object of 
attention is a bill in Congress, one will almost surely have this information, plus hearings and 
reports and maybe a few mentions in private paper collections. For obscure or local bills, 
like the Dallas County local government act, the information will usually be much less 
plentiful. Even in the best cases, however, inference may not be straightforward. 
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To see why, it's useful to introduce the concept of an issue space. To start simply, 
suppose that we can scale an issue from the most liberal to the most conservative position, or 
from spending nothing to spending, say, $1 million, or some other dimension that make sense 
in a particular instance. Suppose that every legislator has an "ideal point" or "bliss point" that 
represents the bill or provision that she would like to see adopted. Legislator 1 prefers point 
A, 2 prefers B, and so on. Then if there are enough legislators and enough roll calls, we may 
be able to determine statistically not only who ends up on the winning side on each, but 
where each legislator ranks on the continuum. By relating speeches to votes, we may be able 
to nail down these positions pretty precisely. Yet there are several obvious difficulties, 
several hidden assumptions in our analysis. Most importantly, we've assumed, in effect, that 
everyone votes and speaks "sincerely," that no strategic behavior or vote trading takes place. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Suppose that I'm one of 25% of the legislators who takes position C, while 30% are at 
about A, and 45% are close to B. Suppose I expect a sequence of votes in which B is the 
committee position reported out, and it is matched first against A' and then against C'. How 
should I vote on A' versus B? 
[Insert Figure 2 Here) 
If I vote for the alternative nearest to my ideal point, I'll favor B over A', and B will 
win by 70-30. But on the next vote, B will beat C', which I prefer, by 75-25, so I end up 
with my second choice. If I vote strategically on the first ballot, A' will beat B, and then C' 
will beat A', because the people at B are closer to it than they are to A'.  So, if I vote 
strategically and no one else does, I will get an outcome (in this example) more to my liking 
than if I vote my true preferences. It should be evident that if everyone votes strategically, 
or if the agenda itself can be voted on, the situation immediately becomes vastly more 
complicated and the outcome is often theoretically indeterminate. Since legislators 
understood the importance of not being earnest long before the invention of game theory or 
spatial models, sets of roll calls will often reflect strategic maneuvering and speaking, and 
one who naively reads intent from the bare record may distort reality. 
A second observation is that legislators may have incentives not only to vote against their 
own preferences, but also to distort what they think is the content of each proposal. If A 
can convince B that A' is actually closer to B than C' is, then A' may win in a sequence of 
roll calls. A's behavior may not only trick B, but it may also confuse later judges or 
historians. While the bill on its face may appear to be close to position A, the debate may 
imply that it's nearer to position B. What should one conclude in this circumstance? 
Two simplifying assumptions are often implicitly employed to solve this difficulty. One 
is that the majority's intent is concentrated at the position of the swing voter. We may refer 
to this as the "swing voter assumption." If C' is the position finally adopted, then, according 
to this assumption, that is what the whole majority favored, even though we may have reason 
to believe that most of the members of the majority preferred, say, B to C'. The majority of 
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the majority may have been inept, or the rules may have been stacked against it, or its 
members may have been so risk-averse or so desirous of a consensus solution that they voted 
for their second choice. 
Another simplifying assumption is that the members of the assembly said what they 
believed and acted as they spoke. This I will term the "sincere voting and speaking 
postulate." Legislators did not contend that the bill's position was at C' and at the same time 
secretly hope that a future judge would construe the bill to have been at position C. It is 
usually difficult- -because of incomplete information--to avoid making assumptions like this, 
if one wants to make any sense of intent, but the analyst ought at least to be aware of what 
she's doing. And in some important cases, we know not only that the swing voter and 
sincerity assumptions were incorrect, but also the direction or directions of the biases. It is 
often remarked, for instance, that opponents of a bill or argument may posit a "parade of 
imaginary horribles" perhaps marching down a "slippery slope" as the inevitable direction if 
the bill is passed or the reasoning accepted. 
In case these considerations seem merely theoretical, let me give an example from the 
recent history of voting rights legislation. The key question in the renewal of the Voting 
Rights Act in the early 1980s was whether section 2 was going to be altered to overrule the 
Bolden decision. To oversimplify, liberals believed that the best indicator of whether blacks 
and Latinos were disadvantaged by an electoral arrangement was whether the candidates of 
their choice--usually but not always black or Latino--were elected in proportion to the 
minority population. On a 5 person board in a 40% black area, for example, two of the 
officials should be expected to be black. Conservatives, led by political appointees in the 
Reagan Justice Department, believed in a strict intent standard, or even in a minimal 
participation criterion. In the first, unless it could be shown that the electoral system had 
been adopted for the specific purpose of racial or ethnic discrimination, that system was 
legal. In the second, as long as blacks or Latinos were allowed to register and vote freely, 
the purposes of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment, in their view, had 
been attained, and the new law should go no further. Moderates wanted Blacks and Latinos 
to have a chance to be elected, but feared that a proportionality test would become too 
mechanical and absolute, and would discourage the sorts of coalitions that elected people like 
themselves to office. Everyone wanted credit for the passage of an act which by 1980 had 
gained almost universal rhetorical support. No one to the left of Jesse Helms wanted to be 
labeled a racist. 
The compromise that was worked out was both ingenious and illustrative of the points 
that I've been stressing. Senator Robert Dole offered an amendment proclaiming an effect 
standard, but disavowing the necessity of proportional representation, and the Democrats, 
particularly the ranking minority member on the Judiciary Committee, Edward Kennedy, 
allowed Dole to claim the credit for breaking the potential deadlock and pushing the bill 
toward passage. In return, Dole allowed Kennedy to write the Senate Report on the bill, a 
task which he delegated to two of the chief civil rights lobbyists on the Act. These men not 
only wrote a strong effect standard into the report, but edged towards proportionality and 
made sure that examples were drawn from all the legal cases that were either known to be 
pending or expected to be filed shortly. When a judge asked subsequently whether Congress 
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meant the law to apply to a case such as that in Hopewell, Virginia, therefore, civil rights 
lawyers could simply ref er him to the Senate Report, which used exactly that example. 
Moderates got the credit, liberals, the gloss, but what was the single intent of Congress? 
The problem is further complicated by two other facts. Before the Kennedy-Dole 
compromise was proposed, Section 2 had already passed the House without a specific 
disavowal of proportional representation, and the House bill had collected more than 60 
Senate sponsors- -enough to shut off a possible filibuster and nearly enough to override a 
presidential veto. Since substantial majorities of both houses, then, were willing to support 
the substitution of an effect for an intent criterion and to stop there, was it Congress's real 
desire not to require proportionality? Moreover, in an example of characteristic chutzpah, 
the Assistant Attorney-General for Civil Rights, William Bradford Reynolds, at least initially 
required his division to act as though Section 2 had not been amended at all, and not to file 
cases unless the intent of the shapers of an electoral system could be clearly shown to have 
been discriminatory.18 Strategize the agenda, strategize the votes, strategize the glosses, and
let some poor judge or historian puzzle out what you wanted done! 
To simplify their interpretive tasks, courts have often adopted rules of thumb, but as the 
1982 Voting Rights Act example shows, an announcement of such rules has further 
complicated matters. If Congresspersons know that courts will take statements in debate by 
major sponsors or the wording of Congressional reports as authoritative, then the political 
game will be extended to include those documents. Winning not only means winning the roll 
calls, but also victory in the succeeding judicial struggles over the interpretation of the act. 
It is a complicated two-stage game with incentives for misrepresentation in both periods. 
Interpretation is at the very least a sensitive task, and no announced interpretive scheme is 
strategy-proof. 
These difficulties are further compounded if we model the legislative situation more 
realistically by relaxing the assumption that there is only one bill, and that that bill's 
provisions are extremely simple. Suppose' that in a 100-person legislature a bill has two 
provisions, neither of which is supported by a majority of the members. But each section 
has rather different coalitions for and against each, as in Figure 3, panel A, where majorities 
actually oppose each provision, or panel B, where a large minority opposes, but decisive 
minorities are indifferent. It is possible that in each case, skilled political entrepreneurs may 
be able to put together enough vote swaps, even without amending either section of the bill, 
to pass both provisions, as in Panel C of Figure 3. The entrepreneurs' task will be facilitated 
if, for example, those who are unfavorable or indifferent or negative toward one proposal 
care more about the proposal that they favor than the one that they don't. In this case, the 
swing voter assumption would be generally false, for on both provisions (or on two or more 
bills, in an obvious extension of the example) many of the swing voters were actually 
opposed or indifferent. In the presence of logrolling, then, the lawmakers' goals are 
fundamentally indeterminant. 
Naturally, there are negative as well as positive logrolls, and one of the most famous 
examples is of the negative variety. In 1957-58, the Warren Court came under harsh attack 
by an uneasy coalition of segregationists and fervent anticommunists. The House passed a 
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bill called H.R. 3, removing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in a relatively minor class of 
cases, but which was seen by both sides as an entering wedge for much more substantial 
attacks. In a story that then-majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson often repeated in his effort 
to court liberals in the contest for the l 960 presidential nomination, the Senate vote on H.R. 
3 stood at 40-40, when latecomer Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, who was. expected to support it, 
stepped into the chamber. Johnson grabbed Kerr by the lapels and backed him into the 
Senate cloakroom, reminded him not only of past debts to LBJ, but also of some pending 
public works measures affecting Oklahoma that Kerr strongly favored. The great arm-twister 
thus changed Kerr's mind, thereby, as Johnson put it with his typical humility, 
singlehandedly saving the Supreme Court. 19
Laws and most constitutional provisions are usually relatively specific. Recent U.S. 
constitutional amendments setting out the procedures for presidential succession, banning the 
poll tax, and allowing l 8 year-olds to vote come to mind. But what of the broad clauses that 
give rise to so much constitutional controversy in the U.S., for instance the First, Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments? What is freedom of speech, the press, religion? 
What constitutes due process of law? What sorts of punishment are cruel and unusual? What 
non-enumerated rights are reserved to the people? What actions deprive persons of equal 
protection of the laws? 
In his Government by Judiciary, a book which provoked bitter controversy in law 
journals, but which has been largely ignored by historians, Raoul Berger attempted to show 
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to outlaw �egregated schools or 
malapportioned legislatures or, by implication, gender-based discrimination or the right to an 
abortion.20 Rather, the amendment was only a tightly constrained attempt to guarantee the
l 866 Civil Rights Act, which he reads very narrowly, against constitutional challenge or
partisan reversal. If Berger is right on the facts, and if constitutional provisions today should 
be interpreted to mean no more and no less then their framers intended, then the foundations 
of the major decisions of the Warren and Burger and even Rehnquist Courts are undermined. 
Brown, Baker v. Carr, Roe v. Wade, Johnson v. Santa Clara, and many more decisions 
represent not good law, but mere judicial overreaching.21 In a pair of 1985 speeches that
attracted widespread attention, Attorney-General Edwin Meese and Supreme Court Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr., popularized Berger and his allies and critics in a heated exchange 
that seems to portend an extended public debate. 22 
Berger's critics have taken two basic tacks. The first accepts or sidesteps his reading of 
the intent of the framers, but dismisses his interpretive premise that the meaning of broad 
constitutional sections should be cabined by the views of men of one or two centuries ago.23 
This view is particularly strong among those who would extend nondiscrimination and due 
process protections to groups or situations that fairly clearly were not envisaged by 
Reconstruction legislators, such as gays, women, and welfare recipients. The second, and less 
travelled, path is to question Berger's account of the framers' intentions.24 While I have
much sympathy with both of these strategies, it is the second that I wish to focus on today. 
Every interpretation, as Ronald Dworkin points out, rests on value-laden principles. The 
Constitution nowhere states that judges, executives, or legislators must discover and abide by 
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the applications o f  broad principles to specific situations that the Framers may (or may not) 
have had in mind a century or two ago. 25 Legal commentators such as Berger who urge the 
adoption of certain maxims of constitutional exegesis and conventions for determining intent 
do not eliminate normative behavior by judges or historians, as they claim to do. Those 
theorists merely believe that choices should be made at the level of interpretive principles, 
rather than on matters of substantive policy, and they implicitly assert that those standards 
are neutral, and that they are chosen independently of substantive outcomes, as though they 
took place behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance.1126 If they do not, if the implications of
adhering to a particular rule of interpretive formula can be largely if perhaps imperfectly 
foreseen, then any rigid distinction between choosing rules and choosing policies dissolves. 
In the instance before us, it is hard to imagine that Berger's muddled, often self­
contradictory, law-office history was cooked up without a consideration of its present-day 
consequences, and utterly ludicrous to maintain that endorsements of his position by such 
persons as Attorney General Edwin Meese were. 
Berger adopts at least eight rules or empirical generalizations to simplify his interpretive 
task, none of which is uncontroversial and all of which bias his conclusions. The first I will 
call the "floor of Congress" rule--only recorded debates in Congress are probative.27 This, of
course, conveniently limits the evidence that one has to examine, but it leaves out 
contemporary letters, newspaper stories, and speeches and debates over ratification in state 
legislatures, as well as previous documents of all kinds that may illuminate doctrinal 
developments that led to the amendment, and actions or statements after 1866 that cast 
reflected light on the motives and meanings of the sponsors. 28 Even if Berger had not read
silence as acquiescence and quoted from speeches very selectively, the rule will bias 
conclusions unless floor comments are a representative sample of all opinions, whether those 
opinions are officially expressed or not. Since large numbers of congressmen, state legislators, 
and campaigners, especially the more radical among them, said very little about Section One 
during the debates, it seems unlikely that the Congressional Record is representative in this 
instance. 29
Berger's second rule is what I've called above the "swing voter assumption"- -Congress is 
taken to have enacted the bliss point of that legislator who is just on the margin between 
voting for or against the proposal. All members whose ideal points are to his right, say, vote 
"nay," while others would prefer more leftist proposals, but capitulate because without the 
swing person or group, they'd lose. 
Closely related is Berger's third assumption, sincere voting and speaking. 30 If some
legislators vote or abstain strategically, then no single person or group is pivotal, and 
therefore no position in an issue space is. Suppose that there is a minimal majority rule in 
effect, for instance, a provision that a constitutional amendment must obtain two-thirds of 
the votes in both houses of Congress, and that opinion is distributed as in figure 4. In this 
graph, the vertical axis measures the number of people taking a certain position, and the 
three clumps of people have modes at "R" (for Radical Republicans), M (for moderate 
Republicans), and D (for Democrats). There are more moderates than anything else, and 
Berger assumes, therefore, that the final position adopted will be at about M or even to the 
right, at T (for two-thirds). But suppose that the R's indicate in public or private that they 
11 
will either vote against M and T or abstain. Then they may be able to convince the other 
Republicans to favor B (for John A. Bingham, who is usually considered the most important 
framer), as against D, which amounts to no change at all. Since abstention and strategic 
voting were rife in the 39th Congress, any political entrepreneur would anticipate the 
possibility and frame his proposals to minimize strategic defections. 31 Since the drafting of
section one necessarily went on mostly in private, and since much of the floor strategy was 
thrashed out in private Republican caucuses, the possibility that the meaning of the 
amendment did not coincide with the moderate swing voter's position certainly cannot be 
ruled out. 32
While he assumes that the proponents of the Amendment were simple-mindedly sincere, 
Berger considers the Democrats strategic liars whose claims that the measure would force the 
abrogation of school segregation and anti-miscegenation laws and would empower the central 
government to protect all the rights of persons against the states should be ignored as 
buncombe. 33 Not only are Berger's remarks about each side's craftiness incongruous, but his
characterization also implies a breadth and vagueness in the Amendment that was necessary 
for the Democratic charges to have any credibility whatsoever. Yet such breadth would go 
,counter to a fifth Berger predisposition--to consider the Fourteenth Amendment a point 
estimate, or, to put it in Dworkin's terms, an effort to legislate a "concrete," rather than a less 
specific "abstract" intent. 34 Scholars have often frustratedly remarked that most of the
comments by advocates of Section One was conducted in sonorous references to Magna Carta, 
the Declaration of Independence, and the protection of freedmen and southern white 
loyalists. 35 But should a debate about the most expansively phrased constitutional provision
after 1791 have been focused on details of the moment, as if Congress were discussing petty 
and easily altered regulations, such as a tariff list, a rivers and harbors appropriation bill, or 
retiring greenbacks? Additionally, in a more practical sense, one of the chief tactics 
employed to hold any coalition together is ambiguity. If the amendment and the discussion 
on it were deliberately kept broad and vague in order to hold the Republicans together 
against a defecting president and a still potentially potent, unreconstructedly racist 
Democratic opposition, does it make sense to treat the Amendment as a shorthand for a 
specific laundry list of positions on schools, suffrage, etc. ?36
Berger also assumes attitude stability in three senses: First, the white northern public 
was, in his eyes, ineradicably and deeply racist and opposed to the centralization of power in 
the national government. This allows him to use statements from the antebellum era as 
evidence about feelings in 1866, to shove the abolitionists and their heirs offstage as a tiny 
minority, and to contend that all Republican politicians must have so feared taking liberal 
positions on racial matters that the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment 
had to have been "conservative" measures.37 Second, because he presumes that individuals
never change, statements at any time in their careers evidence their views in 1866, and none 
of the events of that "critical year" moved them. 38 Third, he assumes that a "moderate" or a
"conservative" position is constant in relation to some timeless scale. If the scale itself is in 
motion- -if, for instance, black suffrage was a "radical" measure for Republicans in 1866, but 
a "mainstream" one by 1869, or if people shifted from faction to faction- -then Berger's 
general argument, which identifies issue positions by their factional sponsorship, is 
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undermined.39 Furthermore, his assumption of individual and societal stasis, if ever an
appropriate simplification, is surely inapplicable to the years of the growth of antislavery 
sentiment, the Civil War, emancipation, and the brutal ideological and social conflicts of the 
Reconstruction period. 
A seventh postulate is that key words and phrases had temporally constant, knife-edge 
sharp, universally recognized definitions. 4o "Liberty" meant only what Blackstone had
denoted by it--freedom of locomotion--a hundred years earlier.41 All the patriotic and
campaign oratory and all the antislavery campaign's books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles 
did not, in  Berger's view, encrust the word with any additional significance. By "due 
process," the Fourteenth Amendment's sponsors ref erred only to procedure, not substance, 
according to Berger, as though there were a "bright line" between the two and as though no 
antebellum natural rights/substantive due process tradition existed.42 By "privileges or
immunities," they signaled only their adherence to Justice Bushrod Washington's 1823 musings 
on the Fourth Amendment's privileges or immunities clause in Corfield v. Coryell, even 
though in practically the sole mention of the point during the printed debates, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Senate Manager, Jacob Howard, specifically disavowed an intention to limit the 
clause to the rights that Justice Washington had enumerated.43 By "equal protection," they
evinced a desire to protect only those particular rights that they had enumerated in the 1866 
Civil Rights Law.44 All of these presumptions serve Berger's evident purpose--to eliminate
national protection of the rights of the disadvantaged--and there is little or no evidence for 
any of them. 
Finally, Berger believes that white racial attitudes form a temporally stable Guttman-type 
scale, from allowing racial intermarriage on one end through school and jury integration, 
black suffrage, the right to hold office, and protection against racially-motivated violence, all 
the way to the "black codes" and slavery on the other end.45 In such a hierarchical scale,
anyone who disavowed black suffrage, say, must, to be consistent, also have opposed any 
policy to its left--for instance, school integration, as in Figure 5. If attitudes did form such 
a scale, if he has properly ordered it, and if no other factors affected people's votes on these 
issues, then Berger is justified in using evidence that Republicans did not force the suffrage 
issue in 1866 as support for his view that they did not intend to mandate school integration, 
outlaw anti-miscegenation statutes, etc. 
All three of these conditionals seem to me wrong. People may be much more willing to 
allow such private, voluntary, non-externality producing acts as the choice of a marriage 
partner to be free of restrictions than they are to favor obligatory racial contacts that might 
directly involve everyone in schools or stores. Democrats with few expectations of capturing 
black votes might more vehemently oppose impartial suffrage than school segregation. Since 
other attitudes and interests affect white positions on racial matters, and everyone may not 
order the scales similarly, this last Berger assumption is just as dubious as its predecessors. 
The determination of intent will never be either easy or uncontroversial, but historians 
will be stuck with the problem as long as we keep asking "why"? and judges and lawyers, as 
long as there are statutes and constitutions to be construed. So far as I know, there is no 
general algoithm for discovering purposes. Uninstructed "common sense" is, as usual, 
13 
frequently misleading. In this as in other instances, perhaps the least guidance is the most 
basic: don't assume that your subjects are simple or stupid; be conscious of your methods 
and biases; put your thesis at risk; and don't adopt theoretical or evidentiary rules that decide 
the case for you. However obvious, these rules are too seldom strictly adhered to, and it 
never hurts to remind oneself and others of them--so that we may all live up to our good 
intentions. 
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